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\Does Anonymity Matter in Electronic Limit Order Markets?"
We develop a model in which limit order traders possess volatility information. We show
that in this case the size of the bid-ask spread is informative about future volatility. Moreover, if
volatility information is in part private, we establish that (a) the size of the bid-ask spread and
(b) its informativeness about future volatility should change in the same direction when limit
order traders' identi¯ers stop being disclosed. We test these predictions using data from the
Paris Bourse. As expected, we ¯nd that the average quoted spread and its informativeness are
signi¯cantly smaller when limit order traders' identi¯ers are concealed. These ¯ndings suggest
that the limit order book is a channel for volatility information.
Keywords: Limit Order Trading, Anonymity, Transparency, Liquidity, Volatility Forecasts.
JEL Classi¯cation: G10, G14, G24\Broker ids are an additional piece of information that can, in some circumstances, be
useful in predicting future market activity. It is apparent that some traders attempt to second-
guess future price movements based on trading by particular brokers."{\ASX Market Reforms{
Enhancing the Liquidity of the Australian Equity Markets", Consultation Paper of the Aus-
tralian Stock Exchange (2003).
1 Introduction
In the past decade, the security industry has witnessed a proliferation of electronic trading sys-
tems. These systems (e.g., INET, ArcaEx, or Reuters D2000-2) are predominantly limit order
markets{that is, markets in which traders can either post quotes (submit limit orders) or hit
posted quotes (submit market orders).1 Yet they still di®er in many ways because market orga-
nizers experiment with various trading rules. This process raises intriguing questions about the
e®ects of market design on market quality.
A case in point is the amount of information provided on traders' identities. Some markets
(e.g., the Hong Kong Stock Exchange or the Australian Stock Exchange) disclose, for each limit
order, the issuing broker's identi¯cation code. In other markets (e.g., INET, Euronext, or the
NYSE), brokers' identi¯ers are concealed. Does it matter? How is market liquidity a®ected by the
disclosure of limit order traders' identities? Is the informational content of the limit order book
altered by anonymity? We take advantage of a change in the organization of the Paris Bourse
to study these questions empirically. The analysis shows that the limit order book contains
information about the likelihood or the magnitude of future price changes{that is, volatility
information.
Intuitively, the limit order book is a conduit for volatility information because limit orders
have option-like features. A sell (resp. buy) limit order is similar to a (free) call (resp. put) option
with a strike price equal to the price of the limit order (Copeland and Galai (1983)). Speculators
exercise these options (\pick o® limit orders") when limit orders become stale after the arrival of
new information. As option values depend on volatility, limit order traders should use volatility
information to price their orders. For instance, in anticipation of increased volatility, they should
bid less aggressively to reduce their exposure to the risk of being picked o®.
We formalize this intuition in a simple model. We contrast two di®erent trading mecha-
1nisms: a non-anonymous market (limit order traders' IDs are visible) and an anonymous market
(limit order traders' IDs are concealed). When volatility information is symmetric, we ¯nd that
anonymity does not matter. A wide bid-ask spread signals that limit order traders expect high
future volatility, but concealing traders' identi¯ers does not alter market liquidity and the infor-
mativeness of the bid-ask spread on future volatility (i.e., its correlation with future volatility).
This irrelevance result breaks down when limit order traders (\dealers" for brevity) have
asymmetric information about future volatility.2 In this case, uninformed dealers learn volatility
information from the limit order book as the latter contains o®ers posted by better-informed
dealers. Now, the information conveyed by the limit order book is less precise when trading is
anonymous, because anonymity prevents uninformed dealers from distinguishing informed o®ers
from uninformed o®ers.
If informed dealers' participation rate is small, uncompetitive quotes constitute a weak signal
that the risk of being picked o® is large, as these quotes most likely come from uninformed
dealers. Thus, they invite competition from other uninformed dealers who instead would stay
put if they knew that these quotes come from informed dealers. In this case, we show that (i)
the average size of the quoted spread and (ii) its informativeness are smaller in the anonymous
system because uninformed dealers are (i) more aggressive and thereby (ii) set the best quotes
more frequently in this system. The ¯rst e®ect works to decrease the bid-ask spread while the
second reduces its correlation with future volatility. Opposite ¯ndings are obtained when the
proportion of informed traders is large. In this case, a wide bid-ask spread constitutes a strong
warning that the risk of being picked o® is large and thereby leads uninformed dealers to behave
less aggressively than when trading is non-anonymous.
These results yield two crisp predictions about the e®ects of switching from non-anonymous to
anonymous trading. First, a switch to anonymity should alter the size of the bid-ask spread and
its informativeness about future volatility. In particular, when informed dealers' participation
rate is small, a switch to anonymity should lead to a decline in (i) the correlation between the
bid-ask spread and future volatility and (ii) the size of the bid-ask spread. Second, for a given
participation rate of informed dealers, the size of the bid-ask spread and its informativeness
should evolve in the same direction after a switch to anonymity. We test these predictions using
data from Euronext (the French Stock Exchange). In this market, identi¯ers for broker-dealers'
limit orders were disclosed until April 23, 2001. Since this date, the limit order book of Euronext
2is anonymous.3
After controlling for changes in market conditions in a multivariate setting, we ¯nd that the
quoted spread and the e®ective spread for the stocks in our sample are signi¯cantly smaller after
the switch to anonymity. Moreover, we divide each trading day into intervals of thirty minutes and
we ¯nd that the bid-ask spread in one period is a statistically signi¯cant predictor of volatility
in the subsequent interval (after controlling for variables that forecast future volatility). But
the strength of the association between the bid-ask spread and future volatility is signi¯cantly
smaller after the switch to anonymity. The results are robust when we model time variations in
conditional returns volatility using a GARCH(1,1) framework. These ¯ndings support our main
testable hypotheses and corroborate the interpretation provided by the model. They also suggest
that volatility information is not entirely public, as if it were, the model indicates that a switch to
anonymity would have no e®ect. Thus, limit order books re°ect both public and private volatility
information.
Researchers have shown that concealing pre-trade information about liquidity demanders'
identities (e.g., block traders) impairs market liquidity.4 In contrast, we focus on the e®ects of pre-
trade information about liquidity suppliers' identities, and our ¯ndings establish that concealing
this type of information can improve market liquidity. Waisburd (2003) analyzes the e®ect of
revealing traders' identities post-trade, using data from Euronext. He considers a sample of stocks
trading in two di®erent regimes: one in which brokers' identities are revealed post-trade and one in
which these identities are concealed. He ¯nds that liquidity is smaller in the post-trade anonymous
regime. Our empirical ¯ndings go in the opposite direction. Thus, taken together, these results
demonstrate that various facets of anonymity (e.g., pre-trade vs. post-trade anonymity) have
di®erent e®ects.
Few articles analyze the e®ects of providing pre-trade information on liquidity suppliers'
identities. Rindi (2002) studies the e®ect of pre-trade disclosure of informed traders' demand.
Volatility information plays no role in her model, however. Simaan, Weaver, and Whitcomb
(2003) argue that non-anonymous trading facilitates collusion among liquidity suppliers. They
¯nd that dealers post more aggressive quotes in Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs)
than in Nasdaq, as predicted by the collusion hypothesis. The collusion hypothesis, however,
does not predict that a switch to anonymity should a®ect the informativeness of bid-ask spreads
on future volatility, as we ¯nd empirically.5
3Our ¯ndings also contribute to the recent literature on the informational content of the limit
order book (Irvine, Benston, and Kandel (2000), Kalay and Wohl (2002), Harris and Panchapage-
san (2005), Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2003)). This literature has analyzed whether the limit order
book (e.g., order imbalances) predicts the direction of future price changes. Our results show
that limit order books can also convey information on the magnitude of future price changes. In
this way, we complement papers identifying speci¯c variables (e.g., earnings in Seppi (1992) or
credit ratings in Odders-White and Ready (2006)) about which trading is informative.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives the
testable hypotheses that we test in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. The proofs are collected in
the Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section we present the model that guides our empirical analysis. In this model, some
traders are informed about the likelihood of a change in the asset value. They use this information
to price their limit orders and, thereby, the limit order book conveys information on future price
volatility. This signaling role for the limit order book is key for our testable implications.
2.1 Market Participants
We consider the market for a risky security. There are three dates, t = 0;1;2. At date 2, the
¯nal value of the security, e V2; is realized:
e V2 = v0 + e I ¤ e ²1; (1)
where e ²1 is equal to, +¾ or ¡¾; with identical probabilities. Variable e I is equal to 1 if an infor-
mation event occurs at date 1 and zero otherwise. An information event occurs with probability
µ0 (0 < µ0 < 1).6 Hence, at date 0, the expected volatility of the security is:
V ar(e V2) = E((e V2 ¡ v0)2) = µ0¾2: (2)
The realized volatility is known at date 1. It is either large (equal to ¾2) or small (zero), depending
on whether an information event occurs or not.
4Speculators and Liquidity Traders. At date 1, a trader arrives and submits a market order
that executes against limit orders posted at date 0 (see below). Figure 1 depicts the trading
process at date 1.
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If an information event occurs, a speculator arrives with probability ® and observes the
innovation, ²1. If ²1 is positive (negative), he picks o® all sell (buy) limit orders with a price
below v0 +¾ (resp. above (v0¡ ¾)). Otherwise, a liquidity trader arrives and submits a buy or a
sell market order with equal probabilities. The liquidity trader's order size, e ql, is either \small"
(equal to one round lot) or \large" (equal to two round lots) with equal probabilities.
Limit Order Traders. Limit orders are posted at date 0. They specify a price and the
maximum quantity a trader is willing to sell or buy at this price. There are two kinds of limit
order traders: (a) value traders and (b) pre-committed traders (see Harris and Hasbrouck (1996)).
Pre-committed traders must buy or sell a given number of shares. Value traders (henceforth
\dealers") do not need to trade per se but submit limit orders if this is pro¯table.
Dealers can be either informed or uninformed. Informed dealers have private information on
future volatility{that is, they know whether or not an information event takes place at date 1.
Uninformed dealers do not have this knowledge. Observe that informed and uninformed dealers
have the same valuation for the security as E(e V2 j I = 1) = E(e V2 j I = 0) = v0.7 Hence, bid-ask
quotes bracket v0 and it cannot be optimal for dealers, whatever their type, to trade against
the book. Yet volatility information is useful because it enables dealers to adjust their order
submission strategy to the level of the risk of being picked o®.
2.2 Timing and Market Structure
At date 0, dealers post their limit orders sequentially, in stages L (¯rst stage) and F (second
stage). With probability ¯ (resp. (1 ¡ ¯)), the trader acting in stage L is an informed dealer
(resp. pre-committed trader). Then, in stage F, an uninformed dealer arrives, observes the limit
order book, and either submits limit orders or stays put. We call the trader acting in stage L
(resp. F): the Leader (resp. the Follower).8 In the non-anonymous limit order market, the
5follower observes the leader's identity (informed/precommitted). In the anonymous market, this
information is not available. Time priority is enforced{that is, the limit order placed by the
leader at a given price is executed before the limit order placed by the follower.
The buy and sell sides of the limit order book are segmented. That is, traders intervening on
each side are di®erent and do not observe o®ers on the opposite side (e.g., sell limit order traders
do not observe buy limit orders). In this way, we can analyze the buy and sell sides of the limit
order book separately and, from now on, we focus only on the sell side. Without segmentation,
the follower's inferences depend on o®ers on each side. The exposition is then more involved
without delivering additional insights.
Sell limit orders can be posted at prices A1 and A2, A1 < A2, such that:
A2 ¡ A1 = A1 ¡ v0 = ¢; (3)
with ¢ < ¾ < 2¢ (¢ is the tick size). Hence, limit orders at price A1 only are exposed to
the risk of being picked o®, as A1 < v0 + ¾ < A2. The price schedule (\limit order book") set
by the leader is a vector giving the number of shares supplied by the leader at each price. For
instance, (0;2) means that the leader has a sell limit order for two round lots at price A2 and
none at price A1. The leader chooses one limit order book among three di®erent possibilities: (a)
a \Thin" book (T ´ (0;2)), (b) a \Shallow" book (S ´ (1;2)) or (c) a \Deep" book (D ´ (2;2)).
After observing the leader's price schedule, the follower submits a limit order at price A1 or
stays put. Dealers choose their order submission strategy to maximize their expected pro¯ts.
Pre-committed traders' decisions are exogenous: they choose price schedule K 2 fT;S;Dg with
probability ©K (0 < ©K < 1).
Our goal is to compare the liquidity and the informativeness of the limit order book in the
anonymous and non-anonymous environments. We use two di®erent measures of market liquidity:
(a) the small trade spread and (b) the large trade spread. The small trade spread, e Ssmall, is the
quoted (half) spread at the end of the bidding stage. Hence, the expected small trade spread is:
E(e Ssmall) = prob( e Q1 ¸ 1)A1 + prob( e Q1 = 0)A2 ¡ v0 = ¢(1 + prob( e Q1 = 0)); (4)
where e Q1 is the number of shares supplied at price A1 at the end of stage F. The large trade
spread, e Slarge, is the di®erence between the marginal execution price of a large market order and
the unconditional expected value of the security. It is conceptually similar to the e®ective spread
6in our empirical analysis. A large market order walks up the limit order book i® the quoted depth
is insu±cient (i.e., e Q1 < 2). Thus, the expected large trade spread is:
E(e Slarge) = prob( e Q1 = 2)A1 + (1 ¡ prob( e Q1 = 2))A2 ¡ v0 = ¢(2 ¡ prob( e Q1 = 2)): (5)
Last, we measure the informativeness of the bid-ask spread on future price volatility by the
covariance between the magnitude of the price movement between dates 0 and 2 and the size of
the small trade spread{that is, Cov(
¯ ¯
¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯ ¯
¯; e Ssmall).
3 Anonymity, Liquidity, and Bid-Ask Spread Informativeness
In this section, we analyze the equilibria of the limit order market and we derive implications that
we test in the next section. We focus on Perfect Bayesian equilibria, which means that (a) the
follower's belief about the likelihood of an information event must be consistent with the leader's
order submission strategy (i.e., determined by Bayes' Rule whenever possible) and (b) dealers'
order submission strategies maximize their expected pro¯t given other traders' strategies. For
brevity, we focus on the case A1 < v0 + ®¾, that is, ¢ < ®¾. In this way, the risk and cost of
being picked o® are large enough to make limit orders at price A1 unpro¯table when there is an
information event. This condition is not key for the ¯ndings (see the discussion at the end of
Section 3.4). It just reduces the number of cases to consider when we describe the equilibria of
the limit order market.
3.1 The Follower's Optimal Reaction
We ¯rst study the follower's optimal strategy, given her beliefs about the occurrence of an in-
formation event. We denote this belief by µK as the follower can learn volatility information by
observing the limit order book.
Let ¦(n;K;µK) be the follower's expected pro¯t, conditional on the arrival of a buy order,
when she submits a sell limit order (at price A1) for n round lots. The follower's optimal order
is the number of round lots, n¤(µK;K) that maximizes ¦(n;K;µK). We have n¤(µK;K) · 2
because it is not optimal to post a limit order whose size exceeds liquidity traders' maximal
demand. If the leader sets a thin book, the bid-ask spread is wide (equal to A2 ¡v0 = 2¢). The
follower can then undercut the leader's o®er with a small limit order (n = 1) or a large limit
7order (n = 2). Alternatively, she can decide to stay put (n = 0). A shallow or a deep book
leaves no room for price improvement. The follower then decides to expand the quoted depth at
price A1 or stays put (n = 1 or n = 0). The next lemma describes her optimal order submission
strategy for each state of the limit order book.
Lemma 1 : The follower's optimal order submission strategy is as follows.
1. When the follower observes a thin book, she submits, at price A1, (i) a large limit order if
2µT®¾
µT®+1 · ¢ and (ii) a small limit order if µT®¾ < ¢ < 2µT®¾
µT®+1. If ¢ = µT®¾, she submits a
small limit order with probability uT and stays put otherwise. If ¢ < µT®¾, she stays put.
2. When the follower observes a shallow book, she submits a small limit order at price A1 if
2µS®¾
µS®+1 · ¢ and stays put otherwise.
3. When the follower observes a deep book, she stays put.
To understand this result, consider the case in which the follower faces a thin book (the
analysis is similar when the follower observes a shallow or a deep book). If she submits a small
limit order, her expected pro¯t is:
¦(1;T;µT) = µT[®(A1 ¡ (v0 + ¾)) + (1 ¡ ®)(A1 ¡ v0)] + (1 ¡ µT)(A1 ¡ v0);
= A1 ¡ (v0 + µT®¾) = ¢ ¡ µT®¾: (6)
If, instead, she submits a large limit order, her expected pro¯t is:
¦(2;T;µT) = µT[2®(A1 ¡ (v0 + ¾)) + E(e ql)(1 ¡ ®)(A1 ¡ v0)] + (1 ¡ µT)E(e ql)(A1 ¡ v0);
because (a) a speculator exhausts the depth available at price A1 and (b) a liquidity trader submits
a market order with size E(e ql), on average. As E(e ql) = 3
2, we obtain (after some manipulations):
¦(2;T;µT) = ¦(1;T;µT)
| {z }









expected pro¯t on the second round lot
; (7)
The expected pro¯t on a large limit order is smaller than that on a small limit order if ¢ <
( 2µT
µT®+1)®¾. Speculators exhaust the depth available at price A1, unlike liquidity traders. Hence,
the second round lot of a large limit order is relatively more exposed to the risk of being picked
o®. For this reason, when the follower assigns a su±ciently large posterior probability to the
8occurence of an information event, she is better o® restricting the size of her limit order. When
¢ < µT®¾, even a small limit order loses money (see Equation (6)) and staying put is optimal.
When ¢ = µT®¾; the follower is indi®erent between staying put and submitting a small limit order
at A1. Thus, she plays a mixed strategy: she submits a small limit order with some probability
denoted uT.
When the limit order book is uninformative, the follower's belief about an information event





This condition guarantees that the leader faces maximal competition from the follower because,
if the limit order book is uninformative, the follower acts in such a way that two round lots are
o®ered at the end of the bidding stage (see Lemma 1).9
3.2 A Benchmark: Volatility Information Is Symmetric
When volatility information is public, the state of the limit order book does not convey new
information, because all dealers have the same information. The follower's belief is either (i)
µK = 1 if there is an information event or (ii) µK = 0 if there is no information event. As the
follower does not learn information from the o®ers posted by the leader, she behaves in the same
way in the anonymous and non-anonymous trading systems. For this reason, anonymity has
no e®ect: market liquidity and the informativeness of the limit order book are identical in each
regime. These claims are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (benchmark): Suppose dealers have symmetric information on future volatility.
1. In the anonymous and non-anonymous trading mechanisms, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the limit order market is as follows: (a) the dealer acting in stage L chooses
schedule T if there is an information event and schedule D otherwise; (b) the follower acts
as described in Lemma 1 with (b.1) µK = 1 if there is an information event and (b.2)
µK = 0 if there is no information event.
2. The average small (resp. large) trade spread is identical in the anonymous and non-
anonymous trading mechanisms.
93. The bid-ask spread is informative{i.e., Cov(
¯
¯ ¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯
¯ ¯; e Ssmall) > 0, and its informativeness
is identical in the anonymous and non-anonymous trading mechanisms.
When an information event is impending, posting a limit order at price A1 is not pro¯table
(as A1 < v0 + ®¾). Hence, the dealer acting in stage L establishes a thin book and the follower
does not undercut his o®er. Conversely, in absence of an information event, limit orders at price
A1 are pro¯table. Hence, the dealer acting in stage L posts a large limit order at price A1,
anticipating that otherwise the follower would do so. These strategies imply that the bid-ask
spread is more likely to be large when dealers expect an information event, which implies:
Cov(
¯
¯ ¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯
¯ ¯; e Ssmall) = ¾Cov(e I; e Ssmall) > 0: (9)
3.3 Equilibria with Asymmetric Volatility Information
Now, we consider the case in which volatility information is asymmetric. In this case, the follower
learns volatility information from the limit order book, and this information is more precise when
she observes the type of the leader. For this reason, order submission strategies depend on
whether trading is anonymous or not. We ¯rst study the case in which trading is anonymous.
3.3.1 The Anonymous Limit Order Market
When an information event is impending, the informed dealer knows that submitting a limit
order at price A1 is not pro¯table. Hence, he sets a thin limit order book (schedule T). When
there is no information event, the risk of being picked o® is nil. The informed dealer can then
post the competitive schedule D (which results in a small bid-ask spread) or he can attempt to
reap a larger pro¯t by posting a wide bid-ask spread (the less competitive schedule T), at the
risk of being undercut by the follower. Formally, let ¸ (resp. (1 ¡ ¸)) be the probability with
which the informed dealer chooses the competitive schedule D (resp. schedule T) when there is
no information event.
The follower's posterior belief conditional on observing a thin book, denoted µT(¸;¯), is:
µT(¸;¯) ´ prob(I = 1 j K = T) = [
(1 ¡ ¯)©T + ¯
(1 ¡ ¯)©T + ¯(µ0 + (1 ¡ µ0)(1 ¡ ¸))
]µ0: (10)
Observe that:
µT(¸;¯) ¸ µ0: (11)
10Thus, when she observes a wide bid-ask spread, the follower marks up the probability of an
information event and thereby her incentive to submit additional limit orders is weakened (the
follower's order size decreases in µT; see Lemma 1). We call this e®ect of a wide spread the
deterrence e®ect. Intuitively, a wide spread acts as a warning for the follower as the book is more
likely to be thin when the informed dealer knows that an information event is pending.10 When
¯ is large enough, the deterrence e®ect is so strong that, in equilibrium, the follower can choose
not to improve upon a wide bid-ask spread, as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 : Let ¯¤ ´
©T(r¡µ0)
(1¡r)µ0+©T(r¡µ0), r ´ ¢




¯ > ¯¤, the following order submission strategies constitute a perfect bayesian equilibrium in the
anonymous market:
1. Given an information event, the informed dealer posts schedule T. Given no information
event, the informed dealer posts schedule D with probability ¸¤(¯) and schedule T with
probability (1 ¡ ¸¤(¯)).
2. When the book is thin, the follower submits a small limit order with probability u¤
T = 3
4 and
otherwise does nothing. When the book is shallow, the follower submits a small limit order.
When the book is deep, the follower stays put.
In equilibrium, the follower's posterior belief when the leader sets a wide bid-ask spread is
µT(¸¤(¯);¯). It turns out that:
®¾µT(¸¤(¯);¯) = ¢: (12)
Hence, in equilibrium, the follower is indi®erent between undercutting the wide spread or staying
put (see Lemma 1). For this reason, she follows a mixed strategy: she improves upon the wide
spread sometimes but not always. Uncertainty on the follower's behavior confronts the informed
dealer with the following trade-o®. If he posts a thin book, he obtains a large expected pro¯t in
case of execution but he takes the risk of being undercut. If he posts a deep book, the expected
pro¯t in case of execution is smaller but execution is guaranteed. In equilibrium, the probability
of being undercut is such that these two actions yield the same expected payo® to the informed
dealer when there is no information event. Thus, randomly choosing one of the two actions
(0 < ¸¤(¯) < 1) is optimal for the informed dealer.
11Intuitively, other things equal, a decrease in the informed dealer's \participation rate," ¯,
reduces the informativeness of the limit order book and thereby weakens the deterrence e®ect.
For this reason, when ¯ is small enough (¯ · ¯¤), the follower always undercuts a wide bid-ask
spread, as shown by the next proposition.
Proposition 3 : When ¯ · ¯¤, the following order submission strategies constitute a perfect
bayesian equilibrium in the anonymous market:
1. Given an information event, the informed dealer chooses schedule T. When there is no
information event, the informed dealer chooses schedule D{that is, ¸ = 1.
2. When the book is thin, the follower submits, at price A1, a small limit order if ¯¤¤ < ¯ · ¯¤
and a large limit order if ¯ · ¯¤¤ with ¯¤¤ ´
©T(r(®µ0+1)¡2µ0)
µ0(2¡r(1+®))+©T(r(®µ0+1)¡2µ0) > 0. For other
states of the limit order book, the follower behaves as described in Proposition 2.
In this case, a thin or a shallow book attract competition from the follower. For this reason, the
informed dealer always posts a deep book whenever this is pro¯table. Given the informed dealer's
order submission strategy, the follower's posterior belief about the likelihood of an information
event, after observing a thin book, is µT(1;¯). It is easily checked that:
µT(1;¯)®¾ · ¢ < (
2µT(1;¯)
µT(1;¯)® + 1
)®¾; for ¯¤¤ < ¯ · ¯¤; (13)
which implies that for ¯ 2 (¯¤¤;¯¤], the follower optimally submits a small limit order when she
observes a thin book (see Lemma 1).11 Intuitively, the deterrence e®ect is too weak to deter
the follower from undercutting the leader's o®er but strong enough to deter her from posting a
large limit order. If ¯ · ¯¤¤, the deterrence e®ect is so weak that the follower submits a large
limit order when the leader establishes a thin book, as she would when the limit order book is
uninformative.
3.3.2 The Non-Anonymous Limit Order Market
The equilibrium strategies in the non-anonymous market can be obtained by considering special
cases of the analysis in the previous section. When ¯ = 0 or ¯ = 1, there is no uncertainty on the
leader's type, even if trading is anonymous. Consequently, equilibrium strategies for the dealers
12when (a) ¯ = 1 or (b) ¯ = 0 in the anonymous market must be identical to those followed in the
non-anonymous market when the leader is (a) an informed dealer or (b) a precommitted trader.12
This remark yields the next result.
Proposition 4 : The following order submission strategies form a perfect bayesian equilibrium
in the non-anonymous market:
1. When the leader is informed, the dealers behave as described in Proposition 2 when ¯ = 1.
2. When the leader is a pre-committed trader, the follower behaves as described in Proposition
3 when ¯ = 0.
In the next section, we use the previous ¯ndings to analyze how liquidity and the informa-
tiveness of the bid-ask spread change following a switch from a non-anonymous to an anonymous
limit order market (\a switch to anonymity").
3.4 Testable Predictions
First, we compare the expected small and large trade spreads (Equations (4) and (5)) in the
anonymous market and in the non-anonymous market. We obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 : When traders have asymmetric information on future volatility, a switch to
anonymity (a) reduces the expected small and large trade spreads when ¯ · ¯¤¤, (b) reduces
the expected small trade spread but increases the expected large trade spread when ¯¤¤ < ¯ · ¯¤,
and (c) enlarges the expected small and large trade spreads when ¯ > ¯¤.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Anonymity prevents the follower from observing the
leader's type. Hence, her order submission strategy in the anonymous market is determined by
the likelihood, ¯, that an informed dealer is active. If informed dealers' participation rate is small
enough (¯ · ¯¤¤), a wide bid-ask spread constitutes a weak signal that the risk of being of picked
o® is large because most likely quotes are posted by uninformed limit order traders. Accordingly,
the follower submits a large limit order when she observes a wide bid-ask spread. Thus, she bids
more aggressively than in the non-anonymous market when the leader posts a wide spread and
turns out to be informed (if she knew that the leader was informed, the follower would indeed
13behave much more cautiously). As the informed dealer faces more intense competition, he also
behaves more competitively than in the non-anonymous market. For these reasons, a switch to
anonymity improves liquidity when ¯ · ¯¤¤.
As ¯ increases, it becomes more likely that quotes have been set by an informed dealer. Hence,
a wide bid-ask spread constitutes a stronger warning for the follower. For this reason, if ¯ > ¯¤¤,
she only submits a small limit order, with probability 1 if ¯ 2 (¯¤¤;¯¤] and probability u¤
T = 3=4
if ¯ > ¯¤. Accordingly, the follower is less aggressive than in the non-anonymous market when
the leader turns out to be uninformed. Thus, for ¯ > ¯¤¤, the switch to anonymity increases the
large trade spread on average because it reduces the frequency with which large limit orders are
submitted. For ¯ > ¯¤, it also reduces the probability of a small, but aggressively priced, limit
order. For this reason, in this case, the switch to anonymity enlarges the small trade spread as
well.13
Corollary 2 : Assume that volatility information is asymmetric. In the non-anonymous market,
the bid-ask spread is informative about future volatility (Cov(
¯ ¯ ¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯ ¯ ¯; e Ssmall) > 0). In the
anonymous market, the informativeness of the bid-ask spread (a) is nil when ¯ · ¯¤ and (b) is
strictly larger than its level in the non-anonymous market when ¯ > ¯¤.
Intuitively, the informativeness of the limit order book depends on the extent to which unin-
formed dealers contribute to its liquidity. Speci¯cally, as uninformed dealers' \participation rate"
increases, quotes become less informative. When ¯ · ¯¤, the follower intervenes more frequently
in the anonymous system. Actually, in this case, she always undercuts the wide bid-ask spread
in the anonymous trading system while she sometimes stays put in the non-anonymous system
(when the wide bid-ask spread is posted by an informed dealer). As a result, the informativeness
of the bid-ask spread is smaller in the anonymous trading system. In contrast, when ¯ > ¯¤,
the follower intervenes less frequently in the anonymous system (see the discussion following
Corollary 1). Consequently, quotes in this system are more informative.
Corollaries 1 and 2 yield our main testable implications. First, Corollary 2 implies that, in the
non-anonymous market, the size of the spread in a given period should be positively correlated
with future price volatility. Second, Corollary 2 implies that the strength of this association should
be altered by the switch to anonymity. In particular, when ¯ · ¯¤, the switch to anonymity
should result in a signi¯cant drop in the informativeness of the bid-ask spread.14 Last, taken
14together, Corollaries 1 and 2 yield a joint restriction on the evolution of bid-ask spreads and
their information content after a switch to anonymity. Actually, for a ¯xed value of ¯, the quoted
spread and its informativeness in the anonymous market are either both smaller or both larger
than in the non-anonymous market. Thus, following a switch to anonymity, the size of the bid-ask
spread and its informativeness should change in the same direction.
The positive association between the bid-ask spread and future volatility obtains when volatil-
ity information is public or private. When volatility information is public, however, a switch to
anonymity should have no e®ect on the informativeness of the bid-ask spread or its size (Proposi-
tion 1). Thus, a test of the previous implications enables us to check whether the bid-ask spread
contains information beyond that available from other public signals.
Other Parameter Values. We have analyzed in detail the case in which ¢ < ®¾. We
obtain similar conclusions for other parameter values. In particular, consider the case in which
®¾ · ¢ < 2®¾
®+1. In this case, it is pro¯table to submit a small limit order at price A1 when
there is an information event. Thus, the informed dealer posts a shallow book when there is an
information event. In this case, it is the shallow book (rather than the thin book) that signals
that an information event is pending. But the implications are qualitatively identical to those
derived when ¢ < ®¾. In particular, a lack of liquidity (manifested by an increase in the large
trade spread) foreshadows an informational event. Furthermore, a switch to anonymity decreases
the size and the informativeness of the large-trade spread if ¯ is small enough.15
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Institutional Background and Dataset
The Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the Brussels Stock Exchange, and the Paris Bourse merged
in September 2000, giving birth to Euronext. The three exchanges decided then to harmonize
their trading rules. This decision provided the impetus for the switch to anonymity of the Paris
Bourse (Euronext Paris).
Euronext Paris uses a trading platform, called \Nouveau Systµ eme de Cotation" (NSC). NSC
is an electronic limit order market, operating continuously for most of the stocks. Limit orders
are submitted through brokers who trade for their own account or on behalf of other investors.
15They specify a limit price and a quantity to buy or to sell at the limit price. NSC also enables
traders to submit hidden orders{i.e., orders that display only a portion of their total size. Limit
orders are stored in the limit order book and are executed in sequence according to price and
time priority. If a limit order is marketable (that is, if its price crosses a limit on the opposite
side of the book) then it is immediately executed. If the size of a buy (resp. sell) marketable
order exceeds the depth available at the best ask (resp. bid) price, then the order walks up (resp.
down) the book until it is ¯lled (entirely or partially, depending on its limit price and size).
Broker-dealers observe (on their computer terminals) all visible limit orders (price and associ-
ated depth) standing in the limit order book. Until April 23, 2001, the issuing broker's identi¯er
was also displayed for each order. On this date, Euronext Paris ceased to disclose these identi¯ers.
The switch to anonymity applied to all stocks listed on Euronext Paris and was the only major
change in trading organization for the constituent stocks of the CAC40 index over our sample
period. Thus, our study focuses on these stocks.16
The data (trades, quotes, and orders) are provided by Euronext Paris (\BDM database").
We use a time-stamped record of all transactions (prices and quantities), best bid and ask quotes,
and quoted depth for the constituent stocks of the CAC40 index. We drop one stock from the
sample because it was delisted from the index during the sample period. Our ¯nal data set
comprises 39 stocks.
We use a 14 trading day pre-event sample (March 26 to April 12, 2001) and a 14 trading day
post-event sample (April 30 to May 20, 2001). The two weeks of observations around April 23,
2001, are dropped to avoid contamination of our ¯ndings due to the proximity of the event date.
The market may not have reached its new equilibrium one week after the structural change. We
therefore repeat our analysis using a second post-event sample, also containing 14 trading days
and extending from July 2 to July 19, 2001.
In all our treatments, we exclude observations collected during the ¯rst and last ¯ve minutes
of the continuous trading period to avoid capturing e®ects due to the proximity of the opening
and closing times. Some marketable limit orders are larger than the quoted depth and walk up or
down the limit order book. In our dataset these orders are reported as multiple trades occcuring
at the same time but at di®erent prices. Following Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995), we aggregate
these multiple trades to a single transaction at the weighted average price.
16INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Table 1 presents summary statistics. The ¯gures reveal a high level of trading activity for the
stocks in our sample. The average daily number of transactions is slightly lower after the switch
to anonymity but exceeds 1,200 in all three sample periods. The share trading volume and the
average trade size are higher in the post-event periods. The trading volume (in euros) increases
between the pre-event period and the ¯rst post-event period but subsequently decreases. All
di®erences are insigni¯cant, however, with the exception of the average trade size (signi¯cantly
larger in the second post-event period) and return volatility (signi¯cantly lower in the post-event
periods).
4.2 Empirical Findings
The model predicts that the switch to anonymity has changed (a) the size of quoted and e®ective
spreads (Corollary 1) and (b) the informativeness of the quoted spread (Corollary 2). Moreover,
these changes should have the same sign (see the discussion at the end of Section 3.4). We ¯rst
study the e®ect of the switch to anonymity on the size of bid-ask spreads and then its e®ect on
the informativeness of the quoted spread.
4.2.1 Anonymity and Market Liquidity
Univariate Analysis. Table 2 reports summary statistics on measures of bid-ask spreads before
and after the switch to anonymity.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Quoted spreads (in euros and relative to the stock price) are lower in the post-event periods.17
The quoted spread in euros decreases from 0:177 euros to 0:146 euros on average from the pre-
event period to the ¯rst post-event period (a decline of 17.5%), and it decreases further to 0:112
euros in the second post-event period (the decline is signi¯cant only in the second post-event
period). Percentage spreads decrease signi¯cantly between the pre-event period and each post-
event period by about ¯ve basis points.
17For each transaction, we compute the e®ective spread de¯ned as:
Effective Spread = 2¤ j P ¡ m j;
where m is the midquote (the midpoint of the best bid and the best ask price) ¯ve seconds prior to
the transaction and P is the transaction price. The e®ective spread di®ers from the quoted spread
when a marketable order executes at multiple prices because the quoted depth is insu±cient to
¯ll the order in full. This variable is a proxy for the large trade spread in our model. In theory,
e®ective spreads and quoted spreads could evolve in the same direction ( ¯ · ¯¤¤ or ¯ > ¯¤) or in
opposite directions after the switch to anonymity (¯¤¤ < ¯ · ¯¤). Table 2 shows that on average,
the e®ective spread decreases from 0.154 euros to 0.129 euros in the ¯rst post-event period and
decreases further to 0.097 euros in the second post-event period.18 The di®erence between the
pre-event period and the second post-event period is statistically signi¯cant.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
In our model, the e®ective spread is a®ected by a switch to anonymity because this switch
a®ects the quoted depth. In reality, a decrease in the e®ective spread can be due both to (a)
an increase in cumulative depth and (b) a decrease in trade size. To control for the impact of
trade size, we sort the transactions by size, form deciles, and then calculate the cross-sectional
average e®ective spread for each decile, before and after the switch to anonymity. The results are
presented in Figure 2. Overall, the e®ective spread has decreased for each trade size decile and
in each post-event period. The decrease is statistically signi¯cant only in the second post-event
period. Thus, consistent with the model, the reduction in the e®ective spread appears to be driven
by an increase in depth. In particular, we observe (last two lines of Table 2) that the quoted
depth (measured in number of shares and in euros) has increased (not always signi¯cantly) after
the switch to anonymity.
Regression Analysis. Quoted and e®ective spreads decline after the switch to anonymity.
This decline could be due to other factors than the switch to anonymity per se. Hence, we use a
regression framework to measure the contribution of the switch to anonymity to the improvement
in liquidity. Our regression model is:
si;t = °0 + °1 log(V olui;t) + °2TSi;t + °3Pi;t + °4¾i;t + °5D
post
t + "i;t; (14)
18where si;t is a measure of the spread, V olui;t is the trading volume (in euros), TSi;t is the average
tick size, Pi;t is the price level, and ¾i;t is the standard deviation of 30-minute midquote returns.
All variables are calculated for each stock and each day (indices i and t identify the stock and
the trading day, respectively). Dpost is a dummy variable that captures the e®ect of the switch to
anonymity on the bid-ask spread (it takes on the value 1 for the observations in the anonymous
regime). We control for the e®ects of trading volume, the price level, and return volatility because
several studies document the importance of these variables for bid-ask spreads (see Stoll (2000)).
As the tick size potentially a®ects the size of the spread, we also include the e®ective average tick
size for stock i as explanatory variable.19
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
We estimate separate regressions for the two post-event periods and for the three spread
measures described above. The results are reported in Table 3 (under the label \Regression 1").
To account for potential autocorrelation in the residuals, we compute t-statistics using Newey-
West standard errors. The independent variables explain a large part of the variation in bid-ask
spreads, as evidenced by R2s ranging from 0.63 to 0.87. All explanatory variables are signi¯cant
and signed as expected. The coe±cient on the post-event dummy is negative and signi¯cant in
each case. The magnitude of this coe±cient indicates that the switch to anonymity has reduced
the quoted spread and the e®ective spread by about 0.02 euros in each post-event period. When
compared to the average pre-event quoted and e®ective spread of 0.177 euros and 0.154 euros,
respectively, the reduction in spreads is economically signi¯cant.
The presence of a ¯xed stock e®ect can be a source of correlation in the residuals of a given
stock. We therefore allow for ¯xed stock e®ects in our regression by including stock-speci¯c
dummy variables. The results are also presented in Table 3 (\Regression 2"; we omit the coe±-
cients on the stock-speci¯c dummy variables to conserve space). The coe±cient on the dummy
variable capturing the impact of a switch to anonymity remains signi¯cantly negative and equal
to about -0.02 euros for the quoted spread and the e®ective spread.
The residuals in our regressions may also be contemporaneously correlated across stocks
because the switch to anonymity a®ects all stocks at the same time. To address that concern,
we include separate dummy variables for each day of the post-event period, as in Boehmer,
Saar, and Yu (2005). We also allow for stock ¯xed e®ects by including a dummy variable for
19each stock. Testing the median of the 14 post-event dummy variables against zero provides a
robust test of the hypothesis that spreads are lower in the post-event period.20 We show the
results in the last three columns of Table 3 (\Regression 3"). Each of the post-event dummy
variables is negative. Furthermore, the median of these post-event dummy variables is negative
and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. Again, the value of the median of the post-event dummy
variables indicates that the switch to anonymity has reduced quoted and e®ective spreads by
about 0.02 euros.
To sum up, the multivariate analysis indicates that the switch to anonymity has reduced both
quoted spreads and e®ective spreads by about 0.02 euros. This reduction is consistent with our
model when ¯ · ¯¤¤ (see Corollary 1). Thus, we expect a decline in the informativeness of the
bid-ask spread on future volatility (Corollary 2).
4.2.2 The Spread as a Signal of Future Price Changes
We now test this prediction and more generally those pertaining to the informativeness of the bid-
ask spread about future volatility. We use the following methodology. We partition each trading
day into ¯fteen 30-minute intervals and two 25-minute intervals (the ¯rst and last interval).
As in our model, we measure the magnitude of the price change in interval ¿ for stock i by
V oli;¿ = jmi;¿ ¡ mi;¿¡1j where mi;¿ is the midquote at the end of interval ¿.21 We then estimate
the following regression model:







ciDi + "i;¿; (15)
where, for stock i and interval ¿, Ni;¿ is the number of transactions, ATri;¿ is the average trade
size, and si;¿ is the quoted bid-ask spread in euros. V olM;¿ is the market volatility, de¯ned as
the absolute change in the value of an equally weighted index of the sample stocks (calculated
using midquotes). Dpost is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-event period and zero in the
pre-event period. Tk;¿ is a trading interval dummy equal to 1 if k = ¿, and the Di are stock-
speci¯c dummy variables allowing for stock ¯xed e®ects. We include lagged variables in the set
of explanatory variables only to avoid a simultaneity bias.
V oli;¿+1 is a measure of ex-post volatility in interval ¿ + 1. Many other studies develop
20measures of ex-post volatility based on absolute returns (e.g., Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994) or
Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001)). It is well known that there are systematic intraday patterns and
clustering in volatility. We include the trading interval dummies, Tk;¿, and the lagged volatility,
V oli;¿, in the set of independent variables to control for these e®ects. Serial dependence in
the news arrival process could induce correlation between volatility and trading volume (see
Bollerslev, Engle, and Nelson (1994)) because both variables are determined by the rate of arrival
of new information. Hence, several authors have used measures of trading activity to forecast
future price volatility (for instance, Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993)). Here, we use the number
of trades and the average trade size as measures of trading activity because Jones, Kaul, and
Lipson (1994) suggest these variables have di®erent informational content for future volatility.
Finally, we include a measure of market volatility, V olM;¿, in the set of explanatory variables to
control for commonalities in volatility changes across stocks (Black (1976)).
The last explanatory variable{that is, the lagged quoted spread in a given period (si;¿){ is the
main focus of this section.22 The model has three predictions regarding the e®ect of this variable.
First, in the non-anonymous market, the bid-ask spread is informative about future volatility
(Corollary 2). Thus, we expect a5 > 0. Second, we expect the strength of this relationship
to be smaller after the switch to anonymity. To test this prediction, we interact the coe±cient
on the quoted spread with a dummy variable (D
post
t ) equal to 1 after the switch to anonymity
and we test whether the coe±cient on this variable is negative{i.e., a6 < 0. Last, in the model,
the bid-ask spread cannot be negatively related to future volatility. Thus, we expect a5 + a6 to
be non-negative. We do not exclude the possibility that in the anonymous market, the bid-ask
spread is not informative about future volatility (i.e., a5 + a6 = 0). In fact, this occurs in the
model when ¯ < ¯¤ (see Corollary 2).
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Table 4 (\Regression 1") reports the results for each post-event period. The coe±cients for
the trading intervals and stock speci¯c dummy variables are jointly signi¯cant. We do not report
their estimates to save space.
Consistent with our ¯rst hypothesis, we ¯nd that the size of the spread in the pre-event
period is positively and signi¯cantly related to future volatility (e.g., a5 = 0:64 for the second
post-event period). In fact, the R2 of the regression falls when the bid-ask spread is not used as
21an explanatory variable (see the two last lines of Table 4). As predicted by our second hypothesis,
the sensitivity of future price volatility to the size of the spread is signi¯cantly smaller in the
anonymous regime (e.g., a6 = ¡0:57 for the second post-event period). Last, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis a5+a6 ¸ 0 in favor of the alternative a5+a6 < 0. In fact, the results suggest
that the bid-ask spread loses its informativeness after the switch to anonymity because a5 + a6
is not di®erent from zero for each post-event period.
The pooled regression analysis restricts the e®ect of anonymity to be uniform across stocks.
The model indicates that cross-sectional variations in ¯ can in principle generate cross-sectional
variations in the sign of the e®ect of anonymity on the informativeness of the bid-ask spread
(a6). To explore this possibility, we also estimate individual regressions for all sample stocks.
The ¯ndings are summarized in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.
Our main result is con¯rmed in these individual regressions. When comparing the pre-event
period to the ¯rst [second] post-event period, the coe±cient on the lagged spread, a5, is positive
in 39 [38] out of 39 cases and signi¯cant at the 10% level or better in 22 [23] cases. The mean
of the coe±cient values is 0.63 [0.63]. The coe±cient on the interaction term, a6, is negative in
37 [37] cases and signi¯cantly so in 22 [31] cases. The mean value is -0.36 [-0.80].23 Consistent
with the model and the results of the pooled regression, we do not reject the null hypothesis
a5 +a6 ¸ 0. The sum of the coe±cients is signi¯cantly positive in the ¯rst post-event period and
not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in the second (the t-values from a cross-sectional t-test are
3.89 and 1.02, respectively).
Last, we also estimate the cross-sectional correlation between (i) the change in the size of the
bid-ask spread and (ii) the change in its informativeness following the switch to anonymity. We
expect this correlation to be positive since, for a given value of ¯, the switch to anonymity should
a®ect the size of the bid-ask spread and its informativeness in the same direction. Speci¯cally,
we estimate the impact of the switch to anonymity on the bid-ask spread (°5 in Equation (14))
for each stock separately and combine the results with those for a6 (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4).
We ¯nd that both the size and the informativeness of the bid-ask spread decrease for 31 [32] of the
39 sample stocks when considering the ¯rst [second] post-event period. As predicted, the cross-
sectional correlation between coe±cients °5 and a6 is positive (0.21 and 0.74 when considering
the ¯rst and the second post-event period, respectively).24
Overall, the ¯ndings support our main predictions: (i) the size of the spread is positively
22related to the magnitude of future price changes in the non-anonymous trading system and (ii)
the strength of this association is signi¯cantly smaller after the switch to anonymity. Moreover,
as expected, liquidity and the informativeness of the bid-ask spread have evolved in the same
direction following the switch to anonymity. As discussed at the end of Section 3.4, these ¯ndings
are consistent with a scenario in which the limit order book contains volatility information, beyond
that available from other public sources.
4.2.3 Robustness Tests
Alternative Measures of Volatility. Various market microstructure e®ects can induce tran-
sient deviations of midquotes from the fair value of the security. At high frequency, these transient
deviations result in a negative correlation in midquote returns (see Hasbrouck (1993)), implying
that mean changes in midquotes are partly predictable. To account for this possibility, we modify
our baseline methodology as follows. We run the following regression for each stock:
¢mi;¿+1 = ai + bi¢mi;¿ + ui;¿+1; (16)
where ¢mi;¿ is the change in midquotes for stock i in interval ¿. We then use the absolute value
of the residuals in each interval (jui¿j) as our measure of ex-post volatility in interval ¿. Using
this alternative measure of volatility we repeat the previous analysis. The results are provided in
Table 4 (\Regression 2"). Clearly, they are very similar to those presented earlier (\Regression
1"). We also repeat our baseline analysis with ex-post volatility measured by (a) the squared
changes in midquotes or (b) the absolute change in the logarithm of midquotes. The results are
qualitatively unchanged but the regressions R2 are smaller. For brevity, we do not report the
results in these cases.
Transitory vs. Permanent Volatility. Our model predicts that the bid-ask spread con-
tains information on the volatility of the \e±cient price". Empirically, we observe changes in
midquotes, not changes in the e±cient price. This raises the possibility that the bid-ask spread
contains information on transitory price changes rather than permanent price changes. This is a
concern if transitory price changes largely contribute to the volatility of midquote changes. To
gauge this contribution, consider the following simple model for the changes in midquotes (in the
spirit of Hasbrouck (1993)).25 Let e mi;¿ and e vi;¿ be respectively the midquote and the e±cient
price at the end of interval ¿ for stock i. We have e mi;¿ = e vi;¿ + e di;¿ where e di;¿ is the deviation
23between the midquote and the e±cient price due to market microstructure e®ects. The e±cient
price, e vi;¿ , follows a random walk and the e di;¿ are i.i.d with variance ¾2
id. Innovations in the
e±cient price, e !i;¿ ´ ¢e vi;¿, and the e di;¿ are independent. In this case, the volatility of midquote
changes is given by V ar(¢mi;¿) = ¾2
i;! +2¾2







Thus, 2 ¤ jcorr(¢mi;¿;¢mi;¿¡1)j is equal to the fraction of total volatility due to transitory
volatility. We estimate corr(¢mi;¿;¢mi;¿¡1) in our sample for each stock separately. For the
sample de¯ned over the pre-event period and the ¯rst post-event period, we ¯nd that even at a
10% level of signi¯cance only 9 out of a total of 39 correlations are signi¯cant. We obtain the
same result for the sample de¯ned over the pre-event and the second post-event period. Thus, at
the data frequency we use, transitory volatility accounts for only a small fraction of the volatility
of midquote changes.
GARCH Speci¯cation. Many empirical studies model time-varying conditional variances
of returns using the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) frame-
work (see Bollerslev, Engle, and Nelson (1994) for a survey). It is of interest to check whether our
¯ndings are robust within this framework. To this end, we estimate the following GARCH(1,1)
model:
¢qa
i;¿+1 = ¹i + µi¢qa
i;¿ + ´i;¿+1 (18)
¾2
i;¿+1 = !i + ¸i´2
i;¿ + °i¾2
i;¿ + ±1V ola
M;¿ + ±2Ni;¿ + ±3ATri;¿ + (±4 + ±5Dpost)si;¿ (19)
´i;¿+1 j ª¿ » N(0;¾2
i;¿+1):
The formulation for the conditional mean equation accounts for ¯rst-order autocorrelation in
the changes in midquotes. Equation (19) models movements in conditional volatility using a
GARCH(1,1) with exogenous explanatory variables (e.g., si;¿) that are identical to those in
our baseline regression model. As for the e®ect of the bid-ask spread, we expect to ¯nd that
±4 > 0, ±5 < 0 and ±4 + ±5 ¸ 0. There are some di®erences to the baseline model. First, to
be closer to the standard speci¯cation in GARCH modeling, we focus on percentage returns for
the midquotes by taking a logarithmic transformation of the midquotes series (i.e., ¢qi;¿+1 ´
log(mi;¿+1) ¡ log(mi;¿)). Second, we control for intraday seasonalities by using adjusted returns
(as suggested by Engle (2000)). That is, we regress the midquote returns on a set of time-of-
day dummies and retain the ¯tted values of the regression. Then, in each interval, we divide the
24actual midquote return by the ¯tted value to obtain the adjusted midquote return, ¢qa
i;¿. Market
volatility, V ola
M;¿, is also measured using adjusted returns.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
We estimate the model for each post-event period and for each stock separately. We summarize
the main ¯ndings in Table 5. When comparing the pre-event period to the ¯rst [second] post-
event period, the coe±cient on the lagged spread, ±4, is positive in 26 [31] out of 39 cases and
signi¯cant at the 10% level or better in 16 [20] cases. The mean of the coe±cient values is 2.86
[2.56]. The coe±cient on the interaction term, ±5, is negative in 36 [34] cases and signi¯cantly
so in 17 [19] cases. The mean value is -1.96 [-1.77]. These results con¯rm the conclusions of the
baseline regressions. The lagged bid-ask spread is positively related to future price volatility, but
the strength of this relationship is smaller in the anonymous trading environment.26 Consistent
with the model and our previous results, the null hypothesis ±4+±5 ¸ 0 is not rejected in favor of
the alternative ±4+±5 < 0. In the ¯rst post-event period the sum of the coe±cients is signi¯cantly
positive (t-value: 2.38) whereas in the second post-event period it is not signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero (t-value: 1.41). These results are similar to those of the stock-speci¯c OLS regressions.
To sum up, the robustness tests con¯rm the ¯ndings in the baseline analysis: (i) the bid-
ask spread predicts future volatility, and (ii) the forecasting power of the spread is lower in the
anonymous regime.
5 Conclusions
Cautious bidding by limit order traders with volatility information signals that they expect an
increase in volatility. In turn, it induces less-informed limit order traders to shade their own bids.
In this framework, we show that a switch to anonymity can increase or decrease the frequency
with which uninformed traders decide to improve upon non-aggressive quotes (a \wide bid-ask
spread"). For this reason, a switch to anonymity alters (i) the size of the quoted spread and (ii)
the informativeness of the quoted spread on future volatility (i.e., the correlation between these
two variables). The direction of the impact of anonymity on these variables depends on informed
traders' participation rate. However, other things equal, this direction should be identical for
both variables.
25We exploit the decision of Euronext Paris to conceal limit order traders' identi¯ers to test
these predictions. For a sample of 39 actively traded stocks, a pooled regression analysis reveals
that:
1. Quoted and e®ective spreads are signi¯cantly smaller after Euronext's switch to anonymity.
2. There is a positive and signi¯cant relationship between price volatility and the lagged bid-
ask spread when trading is non-anonymous.
3. The strength of this relationship is signi¯cantly weaker after the switch to anonymity.
Hence, the informativeness of the bid-ask spread and its size have changed in the same
direction after the switch to anonymity.
These empirical ¯ndings are in line with the predictions of the model and are not easily
explained by alternative theories. When information on future volatility is symmetric, the limit
order book is informative because limit orders re°ect publicly available volatility information.
However, in this case, we show that a switch to anonymity should have no impact on market
liquidity and the informativeness of the bid-ask spread, an implication at odds with our empirical
¯ndings. Rather, these ¯ndings lend support to the hypothesis that volatility information is
asymmetric. In this case, the limit order book contains volatility information beyond that publicly
available.
There are several interesting venues for future research. Our model is based on a simple
intuition: a lack of liquidity in the limit order book foreshadows an information event. This lack
of liquidity manifests itself by a large spread but more generally by a steeper book. This suggests
that the slope of the book, in addition to the size of the spread, may also contain information
on future price volatility.27 This could be tested with more detailed data. On another front,
the analysis raises intriguing questions about the relationships between changes in option prices
and the liquidity of the underlying securities. Options contain information on the price volatility
of the underlying security (see, for instance, Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1993)). How does this
information a®ect limit order prices in the market for the underlying security? Conversely, how
does volatility information contained in the limit order book a®ect option prices?
6 Appendix
26Proof of Lemma 1.
The case in which the follower observes a thin book is analyzed in the text. The follower's
optimal reaction when she observes a shallow book is the value of n that maximizes ¦(n;S;µS):
We obtain:
¦(n;S;µS) = µS[n®(A1 ¡ (v0 + ¾)) +
1
2
(1 ¡ ®)(A1 ¡ v0)] +
1
2
(1 ¡ µS)(A1 ¡ v0)]
= ¦(1;S;µS) + (n ¡ 1)µS®(A1 ¡ (v0 + ¾)):
As A1 < (v0 +¾), we deduce that ¦(1;S;µS) > ¦(n;S;µS) for n ¸ 2. Moreover ¦(1;S;µS) > 0 if
and only if ¢ > ( 2µS
µS®+1)®¾. Thus, n¤(S) = 1 if ¢ > ( 2µS
µS®+1)®¾ and n¤(S) = 0, otherwise. Now
consider the case in which the book is deep at the end of stage L. The follower's expected pro¯t
if she o®ers n round lots at price A1 is:
¦(n;D;µD) = µD[n®(A1 ¡ (v0 + ¾))]:
This is negative if n > 0 because A1 < (v0 + ¾). Thus, n¤(D) = 0.¥
Proof of Proposition 1.
Part 1. Dealers' order submission strategies. Observe that (a) µS = µT = 1 when there
is an information event and (b) µS = µT = 0 when there is no information event (since dealers
have perfect information). Then, the follower's optimal reaction in each state of the book follows
from Lemma 1 and the condition ¢ < ®¾.
Now consider the best response for the dealer acting in stage L given the follower's bidding
strategy. When there is an information event, the follower does not undercut a thin book. The
informed dealer is then better o® setting a thin book as, in this way, he executes all market
orders at price A2. When there is no information event, the follower always ¯lls the book so that
eventually two round lots are o®ered at price A1. We deduce that:
¦L
I=0(T) = 0; ¦L






I=0(K) is the leader's expected pro¯t if he posts schedule K when I = 0 (no information
event). It follows that ¦L
I=0(D) > ¦L
I=0(S) > ¦L
I=0(T). Hence, the dealer acting in stage L
chooses schedule D when there is no information event.
Part 2. Liquidity. As dealers' order submission strategies are identical in the anonymous and
the non-anonymous trading mechanism, we deduce that prob( e Q1 = 0) and prob( e Q1 = 2) are
27also identical in both mechanisms. This implies (see Equations (4) and (5)) that the expected
large trade spread and the expected small trade spread are identical in each trading system when
volatility information is public.
Part 3. Informativeness. By de¯nition:
Cov(
¯
¯ ¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯
¯ ¯; e Ssmall) = ¾Cov(e I; e Ssmall) = ¾[E(e I e Ssmall) ¡ E(e I)E(e Ssmall)]:
We deduce, after straightforward manipulations, that
Cov(
¯ ¯
¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯ ¯
¯; e Ssmall) = ¾µ0(1 ¡ µ0)[E(e Ssmall j e I = 1) ¡ E(e Ssmall j e I = 0)]:
As e Ssmall is either equal to ¢ or 2¢, we obtain that
Cov(
¯ ¯
¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯ ¯
¯; e Ssmall) = ¾µ0(1 ¡ µ0)¢[prob(e Ssmall = 2¢ j e I = 1) ¡ prob(e Ssmall = 2¢ j e I = 0)]:
(20)
Now, given the order submission strategies described in the ¯rst part of Proposition 1, we deduce
that
prob(e Ssmall = 2¢ j e I = 1) = (1 ¡ ¯)©T + ¯;
and prob(e Ssmall = 2¢ j e I = 0) = 0;
in both trading systems. This implies:
Cov(
¯
¯ ¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯
¯ ¯; e Ssmall) = ¾µ0(1 ¡ µ0)¢[(1 ¡ ¯)©T + ¯] > 0;
in both trading systems.¥
Proof of Proposition 2.
Part 1. We show that the follower's order submission strategy is a best response to the
informed dealer's strategy. First, consider the case in which the book is thin at the end of the
¯rst stage. Substituting ¸¤(¯) by its expression in µT(¸;¯) (given by Equation (10)), it is easily
checked that




Using Lemma 1, we conclude that when she observes a thin book, the follower is indi®erent
between submitting a limit order for one round lot or staying put. The mixed strategy given
in the proposition is then a best response for the follower. In equilibrium, the informed dealer
28never chooses a shallow book (whether I = 1 or not). Thus, a shallow book does not contain





Using Lemma 1, we conclude that the follower's optimal reaction when she observes a shallow
book is as described in Proposition 2. Last, it is optimal for the follower (whatever her posterior
belief about the occurence of an information event) to stay put when she observes a deep book
(Lemma 1).
Part 2. We show that the informed dealer's order submission strategy is a best response.
We denote by ¦L
I=i(K) the informed dealer's expected pro¯t if he posts schedule K, when I = i;
i 2 f0;1g. When I = 0; given the follower's reaction in each state, we have:
¦L
I=0(T) = (1 ¡ u¤














I=0(S) = A1 ¡ v0;
and ¦L






4, we obtain ¦L
I=0(D) = ¦L
I=0(T) > ¦L
I=0(S): Thus, when I = 0; the leader optimally
chooses schedule D or schedule T. As she is indi®erent between these two schedules, choosing
schedule D with probability ¸¤(¯) and schedule T with probability (1¡¸¤(¯)) is a best response.
When I = 1, given the follower's reaction, we have (using ¢ < ®¾):
¦L








(A2 ¡ v0)] > 0;
¦L












I=1(T) > 0 > Maxf¦L
I=1(S);¦L
I=1(D)g:
Thus, when I = 1; the leader optimally chooses schedule T.¥
Proof of Proposition 3.
Part 1. We ¯rst show that the follower's order submission strategy is a best response. First
consider the case in which the book is thin. From Equation (10), we obtain:
µT(1;¯) = [
(1 ¡ ¯)©T + ¯
(1 ¡ ¯)©T + ¯µ0
]µ0:








)®¾, when ¯ · ¯¤¤:
The follower's best response when she observes a thin book derives from these remarks and
Lemma 1. In other possible states of the book, the follower's optimal reaction is derived as in
Part 1 of the proof of Proposition 2.
Part 2. We show that the informed dealer's order submission strategy is a best response.
When I = 1, the argument is identical to that in the proof of Proposition 2 (with u¤
T = 1). When




I=0(S) = A1 ¡ v0 = ¢;
¦L
I=0(D) = E( e Qu)(A1 ¡ v0) =
3
2




Thus, the informed dealer optimally chooses schedule D when there is no information event.¥
Proof of Proposition 4.
It follows immediately from the arguments in the text.¥
Proof of Corollary 1.
In what follows, a superscript \a" (resp. \na") indexes the value of a variable in the anony-
mous (resp. non-anonymous) market. For instance, probj( e Q1 = x) denotes the probability that
the quoted depth is equal to x shares in system j.
Part 1. The Small Trade Spread. Using Equation (4), we obtain that
E(e Sa
small) ¡ E(e Sna
small) = ¢(proba( e Q1 = 0) ¡ probna( e Q1 = 0)): (21)
We deduce from Proposition 4 that
probna( e Q1 = 0) = ¯(1 ¡ u¤
T)[µ0 + (1 ¡ µ0)(1 ¡ ¸¤(1))] > 0: (22)
Moreover, we deduce from Propositions 2 and 3 that
proba( e Q1 = 0) =
½
0 when 0 · ¯ · ¯¤;
(1 ¡ ¯)©T(1 ¡ u¤
T) + ¯(1 ¡ u¤
T)(µ0 + (1 ¡ µ0)(1 ¡ ¸¤(¯)) when ¯ > ¯¤:
30Then, after substituting ¸¤(¯) by its expression in the previous equation, we obtain from Equation
(21):
E(e Sa
small) ¡ E(e Sna
small) =
½
¡¢probna( e Q1 = 0) < 0 when 0 · ¯ · ¯¤;
¢[(1 ¡ u¤
T)(1 ¡ ¯)©T(1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ0)¸¤(1))] > 0 when ¯ > ¯¤:
Part 2. Using Equation (5), we obtain that
ESa
large ¡ ESna
large = ¢(probna( e Q1 = 2) ¡ proba( e Q1 = 2)): (23)
Using Proposition 4, we obtain:
probna( e Q1 = 2) = (1 ¡ ¯) + ¯(1 ¡ µ0)¸¤(1) < 1: (24)
Moreover, we deduce from Propositions 2 and 3 that
proba( e Q1 = 2) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 when ¯ · ¯¤¤;
(1 ¡ ¯)(©S + ©D) + ¯(1 ¡ µ0) when ¯¤¤ < ¯ · ¯¤;
(1 ¡ ¯)(©S + ©D) + ¯(1 ¡ µ0)¸¤(¯) when ¯¤ < ¯:
(25)






> > > <
> > > :
¢(probna( e Q1 = 2) ¡ 1) < 0 when ¯ · ¯¤¤;
¢[(1 ¡ ¯)©T + ¯(1 ¡ µ0)(¸¤(1) ¡ 1))] > 0 when ¯¤¤ < ¯ · ¯¤;
¯©T(1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ0)¸¤(1)) > 0 when ¯¤ < ¯:
For the two last lines, the sign of this di®erence is obtained after substituting ¸¤(1) by its
expression.¥
Proof of Corollary 2.
In what follows, a superscript \a" (resp. \na") indexes the value of a variable in the anony-




¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯ ¯
¯; e Ssmall) = ¾µ0(1 ¡ µ0)¢[prob(e Ssmall = 2¢ j e I = 1) ¡ prob(e Ssmall = 2¢ j e I = 0)]:
(26)
1) Informativeness of the bid-ask spread in the non-anonymous system. Using the
order submission strategies described in Proposition 4, we obtain:
probna(e Ssmall = 2¢ j e I = 1) = ¯(1 ¡ u¤
T);





¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯ ¯
¯; e Ssmall) = ¾µ0(1 ¡ µ0)¯(1 ¡ u¤
T)¸¤(1) > 0 for ¯ > 0: (27)
2) Informativeness of the bid-ask spread in the anonymous system. Using the order
submission strategies described in Propositions 2 and 3, we obtain:




((1 ¡ ¯)©T + ¯)(1 ¡ u¤
T) when ¯ > ¯¤;
0 when ¯ · ¯¤;
and




((1 ¡ ¯)©T + ¯(1 ¡ ¸¤(¯)))(1 ¡ u¤
T) when ¯ > ¯¤;




¯ ¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯




¾µ0(1 ¡ µ0)¯(1 ¡ u¤
T)¸¤(¯) > 0 when ¯ > ¯¤;
0 when ¯ · ¯¤:
(28)
As, ¸¤(¯) > ¸¤(1), we deduce from Equations (27) and (28) that
Cova(
¯
¯ ¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯
¯ ¯; e Ssmall) ¡ Covna(
¯
¯ ¯e V2 ¡ v0
¯
¯ ¯; e Ssmall) > 0 when ¯ > ¯¤:
Hence, for ¯ > ¯¤, the bid-ask spread is more informative in the anonymous system. For ¯ · ¯¤,
the informativeness of the bid-ask spread is nil in the anonymous trading system (Equation (28))
and therefore smaller than in the non-anonymous system (see Equation (27)).¥
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35Notes
1Bloom¯eld, O'Hara, and Saar (2005), Section 2, provide an excellent discussion of the literature on limit order
markets.
2Ni, Pan, and Poteshman (2006) provide evidence of trading on volatility information in option markets. Our
analysis shows how volatility information can also be exploited through the placement of limit orders in cash
markets.
3Euronext is of particular interest as its design is close to that of other markets (e.g., the Toronto Stock
Exchange, the Stockholm Stock Exchange, or INET).
4Papers on this topic include Seppi (1990), Forster and George (1992), Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992),
Madhavan and Cheng (1997), Gar¯nkel and Nimalendran (2003), Reiss and Werner (2004), and Theissen (2003).
This line of research contributes to the broader debate on the e®ects of transparency in security markets (see
O'Hara (1995) for a review).
5Comerton-Forde, Frino, and Mollica (2005) extend our empirical analysis for liquidity to a di®erent sample of
stocks listed on the Paris Bourse, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the Korea Stock Exchange. They also ¯nd that
liquidity is larger in the anonymous environment, for the three markets considered in their study.
6An information event can be seen, for instance, as the arrival of public information (corporate announcements,
price movements in related stocks, headline news and so on). Uncertainty on information events is a feature of
other models{e.g., Easley and O'Hara (1992). The implications of the model are identical when (i) an information
event occurs with certainty but (ii) the price impact of the event, ¾, is uncertain. Thus, the model also applies to
scheduled corporate announcements (e.g., earnings announcements).
7In other words, informed dealers have no information on the direction of future price movements. Corporate
events (spin-o®s, earnings and dividends announcements, take-overs and so on) are often associated with a sub-
stantial increase in volatility (see Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991)). Moreover, Kim and Verrechia (1997)
show that volatility increases with the precision of the information released by the announcement. Thus, traders
with information on the occurence of corporate announcements or their precision have volatility information, but
not necessarily directional information. Consider the case of merger announcements. Numerous empirical studies
have shown that this type of announcement has no impact on the price of the acquiring ¯rm, on average. Thus, a
dealer learning that a merger announcement is pending can correctly anticipate that it will trigger a price reaction
for the acquiring ¯rm without being able to predict its direction.
8In our model, the informed dealer always submits his limit orders before the uninformed dealer. The sequence of
moves could be random but this formulation would needlessly complicate the presentation. Actually, the follower's
order submission strategy depends on the leader's type only when (i) the leader has a chance to be informed and
(ii) the follower is uninformed. Hence, this con¯guration is the only case in which concealing the leader's identity
has an e®ect, if any.
369Also, observe that the follower always ¯lls the book in such a way that submitting another limit order is not
pro¯table. Hence, increasing the number of followers cannot make the outcome \more competitive."
10A wide spread deters uninformed dealers from entering more competitive orders in the limit order book as
it signals that the risk of being picked o® is large. Hence, posting a wide spread is a form of limit pricing (see
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Harrington (1987)).
11Note that ¯
¤ < 1 because r < 1 and ¯
¤¤ > 0 under Condition (8). Last, it is easily checked that ¯
¤¤ < ¯
¤.
12The informed dealer never chooses a shallow book in the equilibria described in Section 3.3.1. Thus, when
¯ = 1; the follower's belief conditional on observing a shallow book cannot be determined by Bayes' rule because a
shallow book is out-of-the equilibrium path (an observation with a zero probability of occurence). The equilibrium
obtained by taking ¯ to 1 in Proposition 2 is sustained by the following speci¯cation for the follower's belief after
observing a shallow book : µS(¸;1) = µ0. This is natural as, in equilibrium, Bayes rule implies that µS(¸
¤;¯) = µ0
for any value of ¯ strictly less than 1.
13A switch to anonymity makes the informed dealer more aggressive (that is, he posts the small spread more
frequently). However, this e®ect is not su±cient to counterweight the decrease in the follower's aggressiveness
when ¯ > ¯
¤.
14The informativeness of the bid-ask spread is nil in the anonymous market when ¯ · ¯
¤ because the limit order
book is the only public source of information for uninformed dealers. When these dealers receive other public
signals on future volatility, the informativeness of the bid-ask spread is smaller in the anonymous market when
¯ · ¯
¤, but not nil.
15When ®¾ · ¢ <
2®¾
®+1, the small trade spread is not a®ected by the switch to anonymity. We have focused on
the case ¢ < ®¾ to show that a switch to anonymity a®ects, in general, both the small trade spread and the large
trade spread. When
2®¾
®+1 · ¢, the tick size is so large that it is always pro¯table to submit a large limit order at
price A1, even if an information event occurs with certainty. In this situation, the deterrence e®ect has no bite.
16For other stocks, counterparty IDs used to be disclosed immediately after completion of a transaction until
April 23, 2001, but not after this date. Thus, other stocks have experienced a change in both pre-trade and
post-trade anonymity. In contrast, post-trade anonymity has always been in force for CAC40 stocks. Thus, to
better isolate the e®ects due to the change in pre-trade anonymity, we exclusively focus on CAC40 stocks. Minor
additional changes in trading rules took place on April 23, 2001, for the stocks in our sample. The most important,
maybe, is a change in the treatment of orders triggering a trading halt. Trading halts occur when price changes
exceed pre-speci¯ed thresholds. Before April 23, 2001, traders had the possibility to submit marketable limit
orders resulting in a halt without execution of their order. In contrast, as of April 23, 2001, marketable limit orders
triggering a halt are partially executed up to the threshold price. As this change applies to all stocks, there is no
obvious way to control for its possible e®ects.
17We sample the bid-ask spread each time there is a change in the size of the inside spread or in the quantities
o®ered at the best quotes. We compute both equally weighted daily and time-weighted averages of the quoted
spread. As the results for the two weighting schemes are virtually identical, we restrict the presentation to the
37equally weighted spread measures.
18The average e®ective spread is smaller than the average quoted spread as traders submit their market orders
when the quoted spread is smaller than average. This observation is not due to trades occuring within the quoted
spread (there are no price improvements in Euronext).
19The minimum tick size is a function of the price level in Euronext. For instance, at the time of our study,
the tick size was 0.01 euros for prices below 50 euros and 0.05 euros for prices between 50.05 and 100 euros. This
implies that the tick size changes whenever the price of a stock crosses a threshold level. If the bid and the ask
straddle a threshold price, the minimum tick size is di®erent on the bid and the ask side of the book. Our e®ective
tick size measure takes this into account as it is the average minimum tick size calculated from all bid and ask
quotations for stock i on day t.
20Another way to control for contemporaneous correlation (also proposed by Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005))
is to aggregate the data across stocks. This results in a time-series regression with 28 observations, one for each
trading day. We estimate this model and ¯nd the post-event dummy to be negative and signi¯cant. Results are
omitted for brevity.
21We exclude the overnight return from the sample. Thus, for the ¯rst interval of each trading day, the change
in midquote over this interval is calculated as the di®erence between the last midquote of the interval and the ¯rst
midquote of the interval. We have also used 15-minute intervals for all the tests reported in this section. Results
are qualitatively similar to those reported for 30-minute intervals and are omitted for brevity.
22Our empirical ¯ndings are similar when we use the e®ective spread instead of the quoted spread.
23A possible concern is that there may be contemporaneous correlation among the residuals for di®erent stocks.
To address this issue we analyze the residuals from the separate regressions for each stock. The mean of the 741
pairwise correlations is 0.059 [0.057], suggesting that contemporaneous correlation of the residuals does not pose
problems.
24We eliminate one outlier when calculating the correlation for the second post-event period. One stock has
a large positive coe±cient °5. This coe±cient has the largest absolute value of all 39 coe±cients but is not
signi¯cantly di®erent from 0. Including this observation reduces the correlation from 0.74 to -0.01.
25Hasbrouck (1993) considers transaction prices instead of midquotes. He does not require pricing errors to be
independent from innovations in the e±cient price as we do here.
26Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) estimate a GARCH(1,1) model in the deutsche mark{dollar market that is
conceptually close to our Equation (19). Interestingly, they also ¯nd a positive and signi¯cant contribution of the
bid-ask spread to movements in conditional volatility.
27Naes and Skjeltorp (2003) ¯nd empirically a negative relationship between volatility and the slope of the book.
Their results, however, are not directly comparable to ours because they analyze the comtemporaneous (instead of
the lagged) relationship between volatility and the slope of the book at the daily frequency.
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Mean Mean t-value z-value Mean t-value z-value
Number of trades 1 435 1 371 0.28 0.15 1 248 0.84 0.75
Trade price (€) 85.30 89.80 0.34 0.61 67.85 1.54 1.46
Trading volume (shares) 1 323 177 1 433 757 0.26 0.91 1 532 290 0.48 1.26
Trading volume (€ mio) 83 99 0.73 1.00 83 0.01 0.24
Average trade size (shares) 718 834 1.13 1.16 998 2.42 2.38
Daily return volatility 0.0063 0.0047 5.21 4.46 0.0048 4.38 4.23
Market capitalization (€ mio) 26 431 33 843 1.00 0.64 25 977 0.08 0.06
Table 1 reports cross-sectional daily averages for the variables listed in the first column. For each variable, we first calculate averages for each stock and each day. Then, we average over the 14 days of the pre-event period 
and the post-event period, respectively, for both post-event periods. The pre-event period includes data from March 26, 2001 to April 12, 2001. The two post-event periods include data from April 30, 2001 to May 18, 
2001, and from July 2, 2001 to July 19, 2001, respectively. In order to compute the number of trades, the trade price and the average trade size, we treat transactions occuring at the same time as a single trade. The trade 
price is thus the volume-weighted price of all transactions occuring at the same time. Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of 30-minute midquote returns. For each post-event period, the last two columns report 
the test statistics (a t-test and a z-value for the Wilcoxon test) of the null hypothesis that the pre/post periods differences in means and medians, respectively, are zero.
Post-event 1 Post-event 2Table 2
Changes in Spread and Quoted Depth (univariate analysis)
Pre-event
Mean Mean t-value z-value Mean t-value z-value
Quoted spread €, equally-weighted 0.177 0.146 1.36 1.34 0.112 3.12 3.16
(0.12) (0.10) (0.07)  
Quoted percentage spread, equally-weighted 0.22% 0.17% 3.67 3.35 0.17% 3.63 3.15
(0.08%) (0.06%) (0.05%)
Effective spread, equally-weighted 0.154 0.129 1.27 1.10 0.097 3.13 3.30
(0.11) (0.08) (0.06)
Depth (shares) 1 016 1 211 1.16 1.41 1 680 2.05 2.45
(759) (850) (6 803)
Depth (€) 74 176 93 556 1.45 1.50 98 342 1.33 1.04
(55 165) (71 810) (327 850)
Post-event 1 Post-event 2
Table 2 reports cross-sectional daily averages for the variables listed in the first column. We first calculate averages for each stock and each day. Then, we average over the 14 days of the pre-event period and the post-
event period, respectively, for both post-event periods. The pre-event period includes data from March 26, 2001 to April 12, 2001. The two post-event periods include data from April 30, 2001 to May 18, 2001, and from 
July 2, 2001 to July 19, 2001, respectively. Standard deviations of each variable (dispersion of the daily spread and depth across days and stocks) are given in parentheses. For each post-event period, the last two columns 
report the test statistics (respectively a t-test and a z-value for the Wilcoxon test) of the null hypothesis that the pre/post periods differences in means and medians, respectively, are zero.Table 3
Effect of anonymity on spreads
quoted 






































spread in €, 
equally-
weigted
Constant 0.101 * 0.343 * 0.053 * 0.128 * 0.297 * 0.074 * 0.122 * 0.296 * 0.071 *
(16.85 ) (38.50 ) (7.26 ) (11.19 ) (22.04 ) (7.30 ) (10.40 ) (21.25 ) (6.88 )
Log(volume) -0.031 * -0.047 * -0.019 * -0.020 * -0.027 * -0.011 * -0.018 * -0.027 * -0.009 *
(-23.39 ) (-28.06 ) (-13.77 ) (-8.21 ) (-8.54 ) (-4.51 ) (-6.59 ) (-7.53 ) (-3.57 )
Ticksize 0.561 * 0.563 * 0.681 * 1.152 * 0.824 * 1.064 * 1.149 * 0.810 * 1.075 *
(4.58 ) (5.50 ) (5.27 ) (6.17 ) (3.72 ) (6.51 ) (6.23 ) (3.67 ) (6.58 )
Trade Price 0.0015 * -0.0003 * 0.0011 * 0.0004 * -0.0004 * 0.0004 * 0.0004 * -0.0004 * 0.0004 *
(15.74 ) (-5.21 ) (14.98 ) (2.28 ) (-2.27 ) (2.36 ) (2.20 ) (-2.15 ) (2.04 )
Volatility 7.295 * 9.680 * 7.008 * 5.471 * 7.689 * 4.417 * 5.522 * 7.765 * 4.378 *
(13.74 ) (13.04 ) (10.27 ) (10.12 ) (10.41 ) (7.57 ) (9.60 ) (10.07 ) (7.12 )
Post-Event 1 (Median of the daily 
dummies for Specification 3) -0.024 * -0.027 * -0.018 * -0.025 * -0.034 * -0.021 * -0.026 * -0.032 * -0.022 *
(-7.81 ) (-8.52 ) (-5.60 ) (-10.56 ) (-12.28 ) (-5.49 )
Number of negative daily dummies 14 14 14
Number of significantly negative 
daily dummies at 5% 13 14 11
Adj. R2 0.86 0.64 0.71 0.89 0.73 0.75 0.90 0.74 0.75
quoted 






































spread in €, 
equally-
weigted
Constant 0.092 * 0.345 * 0.050 * 0.089 * 0.304 * 0.040 * 0.091 * 0.303 * 0.039 *
(14.45 ) (36.09 ) (7.36 ) (9.42 ) (22.97 ) (3.01 ) (8.70 ) (20.50 ) (2.66 )
Log(volume) -0.030 * -0.047 * -0.020 * -0.020 * -0.030 * -0.009 * -0.021 * -0.030 * -0.009 *
(-21.44 ) (-24.81 ) (-16.39 ) (-8.55 ) (-8.72 ) (-2.86 ) (-7.74 ) (-7.52 ) (-2.40 )
Ticksize 0.308 * 0.528 * 0.476 * -0.040 * 0.387 * 0.218 * -0.044 * 0.379 * 0.211 *
(2.33 ) (4.87 ) (3.51 ) (-0.25 ) (3.56 ) (1.23 ) (-0.27 ) (3.38 ) (1.19 )
Trade Price 0.0017 * -0.0003 * 0.0013 * 0.0018 * -0.0003 * 0.0014 * 0.0018 * -0.0003 * 0.0014 *
(16.06 ) (-4.97 ) (16.39 ) (14.28 ) (-4.07 ) (14.05 ) (14.17 ) (-3.74 ) (13.98 )
Volatility 7.029 * 10.071 * 6.756 * 5.815 * 8.771 * 4.498 * 5.825 * 8.721 * 4.453 *
(14.45 ) (14.06 ) (9.68 ) (11.16 ) (11.42 ) (8.30 ) (10.91 ) (11.10 ) (7.96 )
Post-Event 1 (Median of the daily 
dummies for Specification 3) -0.023 * -0.033 * -0.019 * -0.026 * -0.035 * -0.024 * -0.026 * -0.035 * -0.023 *
(-9.10 ) (-10.49 ) (-8.01 ) (-11.74 ) (-12.04 ) (-9.62 )
Number of negative daily dummies 14 14 14
Number of significantly negative 
daily dummies at 5% 14 14 14
Adj. R2 0.87 0.63 0.73 0.90 0.70 0.76 0.90 0.71 0.77
Panel A: Pre-event and Post-event 1
Panel B: Pre-event and Post-event 2
Regression 1 : Baseline regression Regression 2: Fixed effects
Regression 3:  Fixed effects and day 
dummies for the post-sample period
In Regression 1, we report the results of an OLS regression of each spread measure on a set of control variables. In Regression 2, we allow for stock-specific intercepts. In Regression 3, we control for cross-
correlation by introducing 14 dummy variables Tt that equal one if the day is t (in the post-event period) and 0 otherwise. We omit the estimates of the intraday dummies and the fixed effects. However, in Regression 
3, we report the median of the day dummy variables. We compute Newey-West standard errors with lag two to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
A "*" denotes significance at the 5% level.
Table 3 presents the estimates of the regression model defined in Equation (14) and reported below
where si,t is a measure of the spread, Volui,t is the trading volume (in euro), TSi,t is the average tick size, Pi,t is the price level and σi,t is the standard deviation of 30-minutes midquote returns. All variables are 
calculated for each stock and each day (indices i and t identify the stock and the trading day, respectively). D
post is a dummy variable that captures the effect of the switch to anonymity on the bid-ask spread (it takes 
on the value 1 for the observations in the anonymous regime). Panel A [B] reports the results of the regressions for the pre-event period and the post-event 1 [post-event 2] period. The pre-event period includes data 
from March 26, 2001 to April 12, 2001. The two post-event periods include data from April 30, 2001 to May 18, 2001, and from July 2, 2001 to July 19, 2001, respectively. 
Regression 1 : Baseline regression Regression 2: Fixed effects
Regression 3:  Fixed effects and day 
dummies for the post-sample period
t i,
post
t 5 t i, 4 t i, 3 t i, 2 t i, 1 0 i, + D + + P + TS + ) log(Volu + = s ε γ σ γ γ γ γ γ t  
 Table 4
Bid-Ask Spreads, Future Volatility and Anonymity
Volatility in [τ,τ+1]
Panel A :  
Pre-event and Post-
event 1
Panel B :  
Pre-event and Post-
event 2
Panel A :  
Pre-event and Post-
event 1
Panel B :  
Pre-event and Post-
event 2
Panel A :  
Pre-event and Post-
event 1
Panel B :  
Pre-event and Post-
event 2
Constant 0.19 * 0.14 * 0.21 0.24 0.11 * 0.22 *
(9.05 ) (6.87 ) (6.45 ) (11.01 )
Volatility in [τ-1,τ] 0.11 * 0.13 * 0.07 0.08 0.10 * 0.11 *
(7.23 ) (7.70 ) (6.18 ) (6.04 )
Average spread in [τ-1,τ] 0.37 * 0.64 * 0.63 0.63 0.44 * 0.76 *
(6.84 ) (11.95 ) [39 / 22] [38 / 23] (7.43 ) (13.13 )
Average spread in [τ-1,τ] * Dummy Post -0.38 * -0.57 * -0.36  -0.80  -0.38 * -0.59 *
(-9.30 ) (-13.73 ) [37 / 22] [37 / 31] (-8.48 ) (-13.10 )
Number of trades in 1,000 in [τ-1,τ] 0.237 * 0.287 * 0.597 0.359 0.208 * 0.266 *
(3.75 ) (4.51 ) (3.29 ) (4.05 )
Average trade size in 1,000 shares in [τ-1,τ] 0.005 -0.004 * -0.000  -0.000  0.005 -0.003 *
(1.67 ) (-3.67 ) (1.79 ) (-3.26 )
Market volatility in [τ-1,τ] 0.07 * 0.04 0.083 0.062 0.07 * 0.04
(3.44 ) (1.50 ) (3.44 ) (1.71 )
Average spread in [τ-1,τ] * (1 + Dummy Post) -0.01  0.07 0.28 -0.18  0.07 0.17
(-0.20 ) (1.16 ) (3.89 ) (-1.02 ) (1.12 ) (2.46 )
R² of the regression with spread and interaction term 0.2596 0.2554 0.1255 0.1490 0.2581 0.2527
R² of the regression without spread and interaction term 0.2465 0.2186 0.2451 0.2112
For each stock in our sample, we partition each trading day into fifteen 30-minutes intervals and two 25-minutes intervals. Using two measures of volatility, we estimate the regression model defined in Equation (15), and reported below:
where si,τ is the average quoted spread in interval τ, D
post is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post event-period and zero in the pre-event period, N i,τ is the number of transactions in interval τ, ATri,τ is the average trade size in interval τ and VolM,τ is a proxy for the market 
volatility in interval τ defined as: 
 
Di is a dummy variable equal to one when the stock is i and zero otherwise, and T k,τ is a dummy variable which is 1 when the interval is k and zero otherwise.
Panel A [B] reports the results of the regressions for the pre-event period and the post-event 1 [post-event 2] period. The pre-event period includes data from March 26, 2001 to April 12, 2001. The two post-event periods include data from April 30, 2001 to May 18, 2001, and 
from July 2, 2001 to July 19, 2001, respectively. 
In Regression 1, we measure price volatility in any interval [τ-1,τ] for stock i by Voli,τ=|mi,τ-mi,τ-1| where mi,τ is the midquote at the end of interval τ. Columns 1 and 2 show the results of the pooled regression.
Regression 1: 
Volatility in [τ-1,τ]  defined as |mi,τ-mi,τ-1|
Columns 3 and 4 summarize the results obtained when estimating the model separately for each stock. Regression coefficients are cross-sectional averages of the coefficients across the 39 stocks. For the bid-ask spread and the spread interacted with the dummy post, we report in 
brackets first the number of coefficients whose signs are as expected (positive for the spread, negative for the interaction term), and second the number of coefficients whose signs are as expected and which are significant at the 10% level or better. 
In Regression 2, the dependent variable is the absolute value of the residual of a regression of the changes in midquotes on its lagged value (see Equation (16)). Otherwise the specification is as in columns 1 and 2.  
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. A "*" denotes significance at the 5% level. To save space, we omit the estimates of the intraday dummies and the fixed effects. 
Pooled regression Summary of individual regressions Pooled regression
Regression 2 : 
Volatility in [τ-1,τ] defined as |ui,τ|
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i i m m τ τ τTable 5
Bid-Ask Spreads, Future Volatility and Anonymity : GARCH Results
Panel A :  
Pre-event and Post-event 1
Panel B :  
Pre-event and Post-event 2
Average spread in [τ-1,τ] mean 2.86 2.56
median 1.15 1.24
# >0 26 31
# > 0 and significant 10% 16 20
# < 0 13 8
# < 0 and significant 10% 0 1
Average spread in [τ-1,τ] * Dummy Post mean -1.97 -1.77
median -0.90 -0.60
# <0 36 34
# < 0 and significant 10% 17 19
# >0 3 5
# > 0 and significant 10% 2 1
Average spread in [τ-1,τ] * (1 + Dummy Post) t-values 2.38 1.41
For each stock in our sample, we partition each trading day into fifteen 30-minutes intervals and two 25-minutes intervals. We estimate the GARCH(1,1) model defined in Equations 
(18) and (19) and reported below for individual stocks:
The dependent variable is the (adjusted) midquote return. To compute it, we first take a logarithmic transformation of the midquotes series. Second, to control for intraday 
seasonalities we regress the midquote returns on a set of time-of-day dummies and we retain the fitted values of the regression. Then, in each interval, we divide the actual midquote 
return by the fitted value to obtain the adjusted midquote return. The mean equation (1) includes the lagged midquote return. The variance equation (2) includes the same explanatory 
variables as our baseline model, i.e. the variables of interest (the lagged quoted spread and an interaction term) and a set of control variables (lagged market volatility, measured by the 
adjusted midquote return of an equally weighted portfolio of the sample stocks, the lagged number of trades and the lagged average trade size).
Panel A [B] reports the results of the regressions for the pre-event period and the post-event 1 [post-event 2] period. The pre-event period includes data from March 26, 2001 to April 
12, 2001. The two post-event periods include data from April 30, 2001 to May 18, 2001, and from July 2, 2001 to July 19, 2001, respectively.    
The table presents summary statistics for the variables of interest.  
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Figure 2 reports the cross-sectional daily average effective spread by trade size decile (trade size is measured in Euros). We first calculate the average effective spread for each stock and each day. 
Then, we average over the 14 days of the pre-event period and the post-event period, respectively, for both post-event periods. The pre-event period includes data from March 26, 2001 to April 12, 
2001. For Panel A, the post-event 1 period includes data from April 30, 2001 to May 18, 2001. For Panel B, the post-event 2 period includes data from July 2, 2001 to July 19, 2001. We also report 
the test statistics (respectively a t-value and a z-value for the Wilcoxon test) of the null hypothesis that the pre/post periods differences in means and medians, respectively, are zero. 
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Pre-event Post-event 1 Student t Mann-Whitney statistic
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Pre-event Post-event 2 Student t Mann-Whitney statistic